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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
McKee, Chief Judge 
 
 Joseph Watson, an inmate at the State Correctional 
Institution at Somerset, Pennsylvania, filed this action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging prison officials violated his First 
Amendment rights by improperly issuing a misconduct 
against him, and by retaliating against him for the exercise of 
his First Amendment rights.  
 
 The District Court dismissed Watson’s suit against 
some of the officials with prejudice, and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the remaining officials on Watson’s 
surviving retaliation claims. Watson then filed this appeal. 
For the following reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings on Watson’s 




  Watson’s claims arise from the alleged mishandling 
and confiscation of his radio during a routine cell search 
conducted by Officer Kline at 8:30 A.M. on December 6, 
2011. According to Watson, while inspecting Watson’s radio, 
Kline pulled the antenna out so far that it broke off. Kline 
claims a portion of the antenna was already broken and had 
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been secured with tape. Watson asserted that the antenna was 
merely loose and not broken, but agreed that it was secured 
with tape when Kline examined it. Watson accused Kline of 
breaking the radio and insisted that Kline have it repaired. 
According to Watson, he consented when Kline explained 
that a broken radio is considered contraband that had to be 
confiscated.1 Watson accompanied Kline to the officer’s desk 
on the cellblock to fill out the paperwork required when an 
inmate’s property is confiscated.  
 
 In completing that paperwork, Kline noted that the 
antenna was already broken when he found it. Watson 
claimed Kline actually broke the radio and was not pleased 
that Kline did not take responsibility.  Watson asked Kline to 
prepare an incident report documenting that Kline broke the 
antenna. Kline refused. Watson then asked Captain Simosko 
for a grievance form, but Simosko refused to give him one.  
 
 Later that day Watson was summoned to the prison 
security office where Officer Coutts purportedly asked 
Watson about the broken radio.  During this exchange, Coutts 
purportedly stated that Watson had given Simosko and Kline 
a “hard time” by asking for a grievance form and insisting 
that the radio be repaired rather than just dropping the matter. 
Coutts allegedly told Watson that, as a result, he was going to 
give Watson a misconduct. According to Watson, Coutts said 
that he (Watson) had not handled the situation “the polite 
way” because he had insisted on filing a grievance.  
 
 Watson did eventually fill out a grievance form that he 
obtained from another prisoner. However, before Watson 
could file his grievance, he was summoned to pick up a 
misconduct notice that had been prepared by Coutts and 
approved and signed by Security Captain Snyder. The 
misconduct notice cited Watson with a Class I misconduct 
and stated that the radio had been confiscated as contraband. 
The misconduct form indicated that it was received at 2:23 
P.M., nearly six hours after the search of Watson’s cell. After 
                                              
1 Department of Corrections Policy, DC-ADM 815, Section 
3.C.1. A broken radio, altered from its original state, is 




receiving the misconduct, Watson filed his grievance against 
Kline. Watson did not file a grievance against anyone else 
who had been involved with the confiscation of his radio or 
the misconduct that was filed against him.  
 
 Watson was ultimately found guilty of the charged 
misconduct at a hearing conducted by Hearing Officer 
Dupont. However, Dupont reduced the level of the 
misconduct from Class I to Class II.  The penalty that was 
imposed was confiscation of Watson’s radio. Watson’s appeal 
of the imposition of a Class II misconduct was denied by the 
Department of Corrections’ Program Review Committee.  
The Committee concluded that Dupont’s decision was 
supported by the evidence at the hearing. Watson appealed 
that decision to the prison superintendent who sustained the 
prior decisions. 
 
 Thereafter, Watson filed the present lawsuit. The 
defendants were Gerald Rozum, Daniel Gehlman, Leo Glass, 
Melissa Hainsworth, Coutts, Dupont, Synder, and Simosko. 
The District Court dismissed all of Watson’s claims with 
prejudice, with the exception of Watson’s retaliation claims 
against Dupont, Simosko, Snyder and Coutts.  
 
 Thereafter, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendations and granted summary judgment in 
favor of each of the remaining defendants and against 
Watson. The District Court agreed that summary judgment 
was appropriate even if the record established that Watson 
had made out a prima facie case of retaliation, because prison 
officials would have issued the misconduct regardless of 
Watson’s protected activity (the “same decision” defense). 




 We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment.2 Summary judgment is 
appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
                                              
2 Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003).   
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a matter of law.3 The judge’s function at the summary 
judgment stage is solely to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact for trial.4  
 
 Watson alleged due process violations, an 
unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment and Fifth Amendment, prison policy violations, 
state law violations and retaliation for engaging in conduct 
protected by the First Amendment. As noted, all of Watson’s 
initial claims were dismissed with prejudice, except for his 
claim for relief based on the alleged retaliation.  Watson now 
appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 
the retaliation claims. Therefore, we need only decide if 
Watson’s retaliation claims survive summary judgment.  
 
 Our analysis is guided by our decision in Rauser v. 
Horn.5  In order to establish illegal retaliation for engaging in 
protected conduct, Watson must prove that: (1) his conduct 
was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse 
action at the hands of prison officials;6 and (3) his 
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.7  Because 
motivation is almost never subject to proof by direct 
evidence, Watson must rely on circumstantial evidence to 
prove a retaliatory motive.  He can satisfy his burden with 
evidence of either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly 
retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with 
timing that suggests a causal link.8  
 
 However, even if Watson establishes a prima facie 
case, prison officials may still prevail if they establish that 
                                              
3 Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002). 
4  Id. 
5 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001). 
6 An adverse action is one “sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment 
rights.” See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
7 Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34. 
8 See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 
267 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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“they would have made the same decision absent the 
protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.”9 This is often referred to as 
the “same decision defense.” For purposes of this appeal, the 
named prison officials assume that Watson engaged in 
constitutionally protected conduct and that he suffered an 
adverse consequence.  They argue that Watson cannot 
establish the required causal nexus between the two and that, 
even if he could, the same decision defense applies.  
However, since we conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
to survive summary judgment as to Coutts, we will explain 
why we believe Watson satisfied the first two prongs of his 
prima facie case rather than merely relying on the defendants’ 
assumption that he has.  
 
A. Whether Watson’s Conduct was Constitutionally Protected 
 
 Watson claims that he engaged in constitutionally 
protected activity when he filed a grievance against a 
corrections officer, and that defendants illegally retaliated by 
citing him for misconduct.  In Mitchell v. Horn, we explained 
that filing such a grievance does “implicate[] conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.”10  Here, the allegedly 
retaliatory conduct occurred before he filed his grievance. 
However, we do not believe that chronology necessarily 
defeats Watson’s retaliation claim because he informed prison 
officials of his intent to file a grievance and requested an 
appropriate form from Simosko before any misconduct was 
filed against him.  For purposes of Watson’s retaliation claim, 
we cannot discern a substantive distinction between 
retaliation for informing prison officials of an intent to file a 
grievance or requesting the necessary forms to do so on the 
one hand, and actually filing such a grievance on the other. 
Accordingly, the record is sufficient to establish the first 
prong of Watson’s prima facie case of retaliation.  
B.  Whether Watson Suffered an Adverse Action at the Hands 
of Prison Officials 
 
 An adverse consequence “need not be great in order to 
be actionable[;]”  rather, it need only be “more than de 
                                              
9 Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  
10 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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minimis.”11 Watson clearly suffered an adverse consequence 
when Coutts charged him with a Class I misconduct.  Class I 
misconducts subject inmates to a range of sanctions, 
including a disadvantageous change in housing assignment, 
placement in restricted housing or restrictive confinement for 
up to 90 days, or a detrimental change in program level.12 
They may also result in loss of the ability to participate in 
prerelease programs, including work release and temporary 
home furloughs for nine months.13 These are clearly more 
than de minimis consequences.  Moreover, even though his 
Class I misconduct was reduced to a Class II misconduct at 
his hearing, Watson lost his radio as a result and the Class II 
misconduct became part of his prison record.  This is 
substantially more than a de minimis consequence for 
someone confined in a prison cell.  
 
C. Whether Watson’s Constitutionally Protected Conduct was 
a Substantial or Motivating Factor in the Decision to 
Discipline Him 
 
 We now arrive at the main contention in this dispute – 
whether the deprivation that Watson suffered was the result of 
his protected activity as required to establish the third prong 
of his prima facie case for illegal retaliation. We agree with 
the District Court’s conclusion that Watson failed on this 
prong and that summary judgment was appropriate for 
Dupont, Simosko and Snyder. 
 
 There is no evidence of improper motivation or 
involvement in the issuance of the misconduct on the part of 
Simosko. As for Snyder and Dupont, Watson attempted to 
connect the confiscation of his radio to lawsuits he previously 
filed against those two. According to Watson, Snyder 
approved the misconduct, and Dupont upheld it, in retaliation 
for a lawsuit that he filed against Snyder in 2008 and for a 
separate lawsuit against Dupont in 2009. Watson has 
conceded, however, that Dupont did not retaliate against him 
regarding the grievance, and that his claim was based solely 
                                              
11 McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
12 37 Pa. Code § 93.10. 
13 Id. § 94.3(a)(4). 
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on a prior lawsuit against Dupont. Indeed, the timing between 
the prior suit against Dupont in 2009 and the confiscation of 
Watson’s radio two years later is just too remote to suggest a 
retaliatory motive here. Likewise, the timing for Snyder is 
even weaker, as he would have approved the misconduct 
charge despite the previous lawsuit Watson filed in 2008.   
Nothing here suggests that those lawsuits had any connection 
whatsoever to the fact that Watson’s radio was deemed to be 
contraband.  
 
 However, Coutts is in a different situation.  As we 
shall explain, the record supports conflicting inferences 
regarding Coutts’ motive in issuing Watson’s misconduct.  
Accordingly, disputed issues of fact surround the retaliation 
claim against Coutts. Summary judgment in favor of him was 
not appropriate.  
 
 As we noted earlier, Watson can establish the third 
element of a prima facie case of retaliation with evidence of: 
(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a 
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a 
causal link.14 However, “the timing of the alleged retaliatory 
action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of retaliatory motive 
before a causal link will be inferred.”15 Moreover, causation, 
like any other fact, can be established from the evidence 
gleaned from the record as a whole.16  “[W]here the temporal 
                                              
14 Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267; Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 
(concluding that “Rauser has demonstrated a suggestive 
temporal proximity between his insistence on his First 
Amendment rights and his [prison] transfer and wage 
reduction.”). 
15 Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Krouse v. 
Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
16 Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (concluding “that the District Court employed too 
restrictive a view of the type of evidence that can be 
considered probative of the causal link. It is not limited to 
timing and demonstrative proof, such as actual antagonistic 
conduct or animus. Rather, it can be other evidence gleaned 
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proximity is not so close as to be ‘unduly suggestive,’” the 
appropriate test is “timing plus other evidence.”17 Here, 
Coutts’ statements to Watson satisfy any requirement for 
“other evidence.” 
 
 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we “view 
the evidence and all justifiable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.”18 We must determine if the record, viewed in this 
light, contains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 
Watson was punished for engaging in protected conduct apart 
from the legitimate misconduct Coutts charged him with.  
 
 Watson argues that the proximity between his 
constitutionally protected action and the challenged adverse 
action is sufficient to establish causation.19 According to 
Watson, only a few hours elapsed between his request for a 
grievance form and the issuance of the misconduct. The 
confiscated items receipt was filled out at 8:40 A.M., soon 
after Kline searched Watson’s cell and discovered Watson’s 
radio.  However, the misconduct was not issued until 2:23 
P.M. that same day; nearly six hours after his radio was 
seized and only after Watson had declared that he was going 
to file a grievance.   
 
 Before Coutts issued the misconduct, he purportedly 
told Watson that he was being written up for giving Kline and 
Simosko a “hard time” and for not being “polite.” Here 
Coutts never elaborated on what he meant by saying Watson 
gave the officers a “hard time” or was not being “polite,” and 
inferences must be drawn in favor of Watson, as the 
nonmoving party.  Accordingly, Watson has established a 
prima facie case against Coutts, because there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Watson’s decision to file a 
                                                                                                     
from the record as a whole from which causation can be 
inferred.”). 
17 Id. at 280.   
18 Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. 
19 Id. (concluding that “Rauser has demonstrated a suggestive 
temporal proximity between his insistence on his First 
Amendment rights and his transfer and wage reduction.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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grievance motivated Coutts to charge him with misconduct. 
Since he has established a prima facie case, we then look to 




 We begin our discussion of whether Coutts was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of  law with our decision in 
Carter v. McGrady.20  There, an inmate claimed that he was 
given a misconduct because prison officials resented his 
functioning as a jailhouse lawyer.  In rejecting that claim, we 
noted that most prisoners’ retaliation claims will fail if the 
misconduct charges are supported by the evidence. We 
explained that “[e]ven if prison officials were motivated by 
animus to jailhouse lawyers, Carter’s offenses, such as 
receiving stolen property, were so clear and overt that we 
cannot say that the disciplinary action taken against Carter 
was retaliatory.”21 Accordingly, we “[could] not say that the 
prison officials’ decision to discipline Carter for his violations 
of prison policy was not within the ‘broad discretion’ that we 
must afford them.”22 In reaching that conclusion, we 
emphasized the “great deference” that the decisions of prison 
administrators are entitled to in the context of disciplinary 
proceedings.23  
 
 Not all Circuit Courts of Appeals agree on this 
standard. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits have formulated a same decision defense 
based on some evidence of prisoner misconduct,24 which 
                                              
20 292 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2002). 
21 Carter, 292 F.3d at 159. 
22 Id. (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989) 
(quotations in original).   
23 Id. at 158. 
24 See, e.g., Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that 
the plaintiff would have received the same punishment even 
absent the retaliatory motivation. The defendant can meet this 
burden by demonstrating that there is no dispute that the 
plaintiff ‘committed the most serious, if not all, of the 
prohibited conduct charged in the misbehavior report.’”) 
(citation omitted); Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 
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originates from the Supreme Court decision in 
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill.25  There, 
the Court held that prison disciplinary convictions may be 
upheld if they are supported by “some evidence” of 
misconduct. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits, however, have found that some evidence is not an 
absolute bar and permit claims by prisoners to go to trial if 
the prisoner can offer evidence that contradicts prison 
officials’ explanations for their action against the inmate.26  
                                                                                                     
(8th Cir.2008) (reviewing allegations of false disciplinary 
reports and concluding “claims of retaliation fail if the alleged 
retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual 
violation of a prison rule.”)(citation omitted); Orebaugh v. 
Caspari, 910 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.1990) (noting that “[N]o 
claim can be stated when the alleged retaliation arose from 
discipline imparted for acts that a prisoner was not entitled to 
perform.”); Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 
1994)  (holding if there is “some evidence” that a prisoner 
committed the alleged misconduct, that “essentially 
checkmates his retaliation claim.”); O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 
F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 2011)(noting that “if the [prison] 
official can show that he would have taken the disciplinary 
action in the absence of the prisoner’s protected conduct, he 
cannot be held liable.”). 
25 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985) (concluding “that where good 
time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision 
to revoke such credits must be supported by some 
evidence.”).   
26 Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (5th Cir.1995) 
(noting that a retaliation claim focuses not on the merits of the 
disciplinary proceeding but on the retaliatory “interference, 
asking only whether there has been an obstruction of the 
exercise of a constitutional right.”). The “concern is whether 
there was retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right, 
separate and apart from the apparent validity of the 
underlying disciplinary” conviction. Id.; Greene v. Doruff, 
660 F.3d 975, 977–80 (7th Cir.2011) (adopting but-for 
causation with burden-shifting mechanism, and noting that 
once prisoner shows that the violation was a motivating 
factor, “the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the 
harm would have occurred anyway.”). Although a state 
appellate court decision, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
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However, in Rauser, we held that the defendant must 
establish that the same decision would have been made even 
absent any retaliatory motive.27 
 
As noted, in Carter we explained that we evaluate the 
“the quantum of evidence” of the misconduct to determine 
whether the prison officials’ decision to discipline an inmate 
for his violations of prison policy was within the broad 
discretion we must afford them.28 Given the force of the 
evidence that Carter was guilty of receiving stolen property, 
we held that the there was no genuine issue of material fact 
that his misconduct citation was reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests, and that Carter would have 
been disciplined notwithstanding his jailhouse lawyering.29  
 
Watson’s situation is different. Watson’s broken radio 
was not so “clear and overt” a violation that we can conclude 
that he would have been written up if he had not also given 
prison officials “a hard time.” The radio had allegedly been in 
the same condition for more than a year. Moreover, there is 
evidence that other inmates had radios with loose or broken 
antennas, but those items were not confiscated and the 
inmates did not receive a misconduct.  Finally, Kline did not 
charge Watson with a misconduct when he confiscated the 
radio.  Accordingly, a reasonable fact finder could conclude 
that the misconduct was issued in retaliation for Watson’s 
statement that he was going to file a grievance, and not in 
furtherance of legitimate penological goals.  
 
 We note that this is not the first time that we have held 
that a plaintiff can make out a retaliation claim even though 
                                                                                                     
provides an example of a more flexible approach. See Medley 
v. Lemmon, 994 N.E.2d 1177, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013)(noting that it is not clear whether a “retaliation claim 
should automatically be defeated in such a situation, 
especially where the decision of what punishment to impose 
on a prisoner for a rules infraction is entirely discretionary.”). 
27 Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 n.2 (citing Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 
734, 737 (8th Cir.1993) as an example of a Circuit that takes 
an opposing approach to ours). 




the charge against him may have been factually supported.30  
In Hill v. City of Scranton, four police officers survived 
summary judgment on their claims that the city had retaliated 
against them by selectively enforcing an ordinance to punish 
them for a lawsuit that they had brought even though it was 
clear that three officers violated the relevant ordinance.31 We 
reasoned that it was not necessary for the officers to allege or 
prove compliance with the ordinance to prevail on their First 




For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Watson’s 
retaliatory claims against Dupont, Simosko and Snyder, but 
reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Coutts and 








                                              
30 411 F.3d 118, 130 (3d. Cir. 2005). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (noting that “The officers certainly do not need to allege 
or prove compliance with the ordinance to prevail on their 
First Amendment claim. Discriminatory enforcement of a 
statute or ordinance is not justified simply because the 
enforcement is otherwise valid.”). 
Joseph Watson v. Gerald Rozum et al.  
No.  13-3510 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring 
 Imagine a guard tells an inmate accused of misconduct 
that he never would have been charged if he had not filed a 
complaint against prison officials. The inmate admits to the 
misconduct but argues that the retaliatory enforcement is 
nonetheless unlawful. Can the guard, having conceded that 
the outcome would have been different without the complaint, 
still take advantage of something we call the “same decision” 
defense? If we are to give any meaning to the name of the 
defense, the answer must be “no.”  
 However, some panels of our Court have come out 
differently in non-precedential opinions, leading to confusion 
in the district courts about the state of our law. Those 
outcomes, though incorrect in my view, draw support from 
decisions in some of our sister circuits. Thus, in addition to 
joining Chief Judge McKee’s excellent opinion, which fully 
resolves our case, I write separately to discuss the application 
of the same decision defense in future lawsuits. 
 In our Court, the confusion starts with our decision in 
Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2002). That case 
involved a prisoner who was disciplined for “egregious 
violations of prison policy,” including receiving a stolen 
typewriter and sending unauthorized letters. Id. at 154. He 
argued that the reason for the disciplinary charges was that 
prison officials resented him for working as a jailhouse 
lawyer. However, there was overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt and nothing concrete to suggest that he was being 
charged only because he helped other inmates with their legal 
matters. We therefore concluded that, even if he could 
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establish a prima facie First Amendment retaliation case, the 
same decision defense applied. We wrote: 
Given the quantum of evidence of Carter’s 
misconduct, we cannot say that the prison 
officials’ decision to discipline Carter for his 
violations of prison policy was not within the 
broad discretion that we must afford them. Even 
if prison officials were motivated by animus to 
jailhouse lawyers, Carter’s offenses, such as 
receiving stolen property, were so clear and 
overt that we cannot say that the disciplinary 
action taken against Carter was retaliatory. 
Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 This passage raised two questions. First, what 
“quantum” of evidence is required to trigger Carter? And in 
cases where that “quantum” has been reached, can the same 
decision defense nonetheless fail? Until today’s decision we 
had never addressed either question in a precedential opinion. 
However, a series of non-precedential opinions from panels 
of our Court suggested that the answer to the first question is 
merely “some evidence” and that the answer to the second is 
“no.” See, e.g., Bullock v. Buck, 611 F. App’x 744, 748 (3d 
Cir. 2015); Dockery v. Beard, 509 F. App’x 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
2013). Under Internal Operating Procedure 5.7, these non-
precedential opinions do not speak for the full Court or 
constitute binding precedent. However, our district courts 
have applied these answers in more than 80 cases, and the 
time has come for us to clarify. 
 So from where, if not Carter, do these answers come? 
As it turns out, our district courts and our non-precedential 
opinions have borrowed them from the Eighth Circuit. In  
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Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1990), that 
Court held that, “[w]hile a prisoner can state a claim of 
retaliation by alleging that disciplinary actions were based 
upon false allegations, no claim can be stated when the 
alleged retaliation arose from discipline imparted for acts that 
a prisoner was not entitled to perform.” Id. at 528. It reasoned 
that a contrary holding “would allow a prisoner to openly 
flout prison rules after filing a grievance and then bring a 
claim under section 1983 arguing that prison officials 
disciplined him in retaliation for his filing a grievance.” Id. 
Thus, it gave a “no” answer to our second question—whether 
a prisoner can ever succeed in a retaliation lawsuit when there 
is sufficient evidence that he was disciplined for misconduct 
he actually committed. As for the first question—the amount 
of proof required—the Court implied that the standard is 
“some evidence” supporting the misconduct charge. Id.  
 Next, in Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 
1994), the Court expressly adopted the “some evidence” 
standard. Specifically, it held that a “finding [of misconduct 
that] was based on some evidence of the violation . . . 
essentially checkmates [a] retaliation claim.” Id. at 469. Lest 
anyone draw too much encouragement from the word 
“essentially,” the Court later restated its test without that 
qualifier. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 829 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (“[C]laims of retaliation fail if the alleged 
retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual 
violation of a prison rule. Thus, a defendant may successfully 
defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing some 
evidence the inmate actually committed a rule violation.”) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 Our district courts and our non-precedential opinions 
have treated these Eighth Circuit cases as a way to give 
meaning to Carter’s standards. This is a problem for two 
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reasons. First, Carter never said that “some evidence” is a 
sufficient “quantum” or that it is impossible for a prisoner to 
succeed in a retaliation case when there is enough evidence of 
misconduct. And second, I believe that the Eighth Circuit’s 
cases were wrongly decided and that, even if that were not so, 
our precedent prevents us from importing them into our law.  
 Judge Heaney’s partial dissent in Orebaugh 
persuasively explains the problems with the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning. He wrote that “no court has heretofore 
articulated . . . a rule” that “the legitimate reasons the prison 
officials have advanced”—i.e., that the prisoner actually 
engaged in misconduct—“are dispositive of [a] retaliation 
claim.” 910 F.2d at 529–30 (Heaney, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). He said that a prisoner instead 
“deserves the opportunity to try to show that the reasons 
given for disciplining him were a pretext for the prison 
officials’ retaliatory animus.” Id. He concluded by observing: 
In its zeal to stem the tide of prisoner litigation 
and in a misguided attempt to discourage the 
open flouting of prison rules, the majority . . . 
denies Orebaugh . . . equal access to the 
adversarial process . . . and deprives this court 
of the opportunity to review Orebaugh’s 
retaliation claim on an adequately developed 
record. In so doing, the majority immunizes 
from review any trivial disciplinary charge that 
prison officials can support with some evidence, 
allowing such officials to inhibit prisoners’ 
constitutional right of access to grievance 
procedures with impunity.  
Id. at 530.  
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 The Fifth Circuit has agreed with Judge Heaney. It 
noted that the Eighth Circuit’s approach might make sense for 
malicious prosecution claims, which require plaintiffs to 
show that the charges against them were legally “groundless.” 
Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (5th Cir. 1995). A 
“retaliation claim, on the other hand, focuses on . . . 
interference, asking only whether there has been an 
obstruction of the exercise of a constitutional right.” Id. at 
1165. It therefore held that an “action motivated by retaliation 
for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is 
actionable, even if the act, when taken for a different reason, 
might have been legitimate.” Id. Any other ruling “would 
unfairly tempt corrections officers to enrobe themselves and 
their colleagues in what would be an absolute shield against 
retaliation claims.” Id.  
 Meanwhile, other than concerns over an onslaught of 
lawsuits, the Eighth Circuit has given very little justification 
for its approach. The closest we get is a citation in Henderson 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent v. Hill, 
472 U.S. 445 (1985). That decision does use the term “some 
evidence,” but in a different context. The Supreme Court 
addressed a claim that officials violated a prisoner’s Fifth 
Amendment due process rights by arbitrarily taking away his 
good time credits, which would have lowered his sentence 
based on good behavior. The Court ruled that the Constitution 
requires, at a minimum, that prison disciplinary decisions be 
supported by “some evidence” before officials can interfere 
with an inmate’s protected liberty interests. Id. at 447.  
 Nothing in Hill requires, or even suggests, its use in 
First Amendment retaliation cases, and the Eighth Circuit has 
not explained why it has applied that standard. Hill says that a 
disciplinary proceeding will not be constitutionally infirm if 
there is “some evidence.” But officials cannot cleanse a First 
Amendment violation merely by complying with the Fifth 
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Amendment. Due process requires that a prisoner have a fair 
opportunity to show that he did not commit the misconduct. 
The First Amendment provides that, even if he did commit it, 
he has a right to be free from enforcement that would not 
have occurred if he had not filed a complaint. See, e.g., 
Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The 
issue in Hill was merely whether there was, and whether there 
needed to be, some evidence to support a prison disciplinary 
decision. The issue here is whether the disciplinary decision 
was improperly motivated.”).  
 There is another reason not to apply the Eighth 
Circuit’s test in our cases. In that Circuit a plaintiff has the 
burden to disprove the same decision defense. See Goff v. 
Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit 
has acknowledged that, in the employment retaliation context, 
the Supreme Court has put the burden of establishing the 
defense on the defendant. See id. at 737–38 (citing Mount 
Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). However, 
it has declined to use the Mount Healthy test in prisoner 
retaliation cases. Id.  
 By contrast, we have rejected Goff and, per Mount 
Healthy, placed the burden in prisoner retaliation cases on the 
defendant to establish the same decision defense. See Rauser 
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (adopting 
Mount Healthy and disagreeing with Goff). Our use of Mount 
Healthy is significant. That is because, as Chief Judge McKee 
notes in our panel’s majority opinion, we already have held 
that the same decision defense from Mount Healthy does not 
automatically bar liability when a plaintiff is charged, based 
on retaliatory motivations, for misconduct that he actually 
committed.  
 For instance, in Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118 
(3d Cir. 2005), police officers were fired for violating an 
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ordinance. It was clear that they did not comply with the 
ordinance, but they argued that the City would not have 
enforced it had they not engaged in constitutionally protected 
activity. We held that under Mounty Healthy the officers did 
not need to show “compliance with the ordinance to prevail 
on their First Amendment claim” because “[d]iscriminatory 
enforcement of a statute or ordinance is not justified simply 
because the enforcement is otherwise valid.” Id. at 130. The 
same should be true here.1   
                                              
1 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Eighth Circuit’s 
approach. See O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1215 (11th 
Cir. 2011). Thus, my criticisms of the latter’s test apply with 
equal force to the former’s. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit 
has reached a similar result, albeit by different reasoning. See 
Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The 
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the plaintiff 
would have received the same punishment even absent the 
retaliatory motivation. The defendant can meet this burden by 
demonstrating that there is no dispute that the plaintiff 
‘committed the most serious, if not all, of the prohibited 
conduct charged in the misbehavior report.’”) (internal 
citation omitted) (quoting Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 
657 (2d Cir. 1998)). Hynes, in turn, relies on a “presumption 
that a prison official’s acts to maintain order are done for a 
proper purpose.” 143 F.3d at 657 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The problem is that the Court never explains why 
this presumption cannot be rebutted. Surely there are 
circumstances where evidence can show that an official was 
not acting for a proper purpose. But this test closes the door to 
such proof. I note, however, that the Second Circuit’s 
approach, though one I disagree with, at least requires that 
there be “no dispute” as opposed to merely “some evidence.”  
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 Today’s decision takes an important step toward 
clarifying that Carter does not incorporate the Eighth 
Circuit’s approach. In particular, there is undoubtedly “some 
evidence” that Joseph Watson’s prison radio was contraband. 
But we correctly hold that this is not the type of “clear and 
overt” misconduct that satisfies Carter’s “quantum of 
evidence” standard. See Carter, 292 F.3d at 159.  
 Indeed, this case provides an example of why Judge 
Heaney and the Fifth Circuit in my view are correct. 
Watson’s radio was normal in all respects but one—it had a 
small piece of tape securing the antenna. Prison regulations 
define contraband to include “any item altered from its 
original state.” See Department of Corrections Policy, DC-
ADM 815, Section 3.C.1. Under this definition, ethereal in 
the kindest sense, Watson’s taped-up radio counted. And, as 
Chief Judge McKee notes, punishment for contraband 
violations can include up to 90 days in restrictive 
confinement. If officials were allowed to hunt for every minor 
instance of misconduct in an effort to punish inmates for their 
speech, the First Amendment would ring hollow inside a 
prison’s walls.  
  Though Chief Judge McKee’s opinion provides 
needed guidance on the first question left open by Carter (the 
“quantum” of evidence that is needed), it has no occasion to 
reach the second (whether the same decision defense can ever 
fail if there is a sufficient “quantum”). For this second 
question to arise, the evidence of misconduct would need to 
be greater (a sufficient “quantum” under Carter) than it was 
here, and the proof that the official would not have taken the 
same action in the absence of constitutionally protected 
activity would need to be stronger. Take, for instance, the 
hypothetical at the beginning of this concurring opinion, 
where the guard admits that there would have been no charge 
without the complaint. What then?  
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 This is an important question, and I hope that in future 
cases we will be able to provide a clear answer. As discussed, 
in Carter we held that, “[e]ven if prison officials were 
motivated by animus to jailhouse lawyers,” the offenses 
“were so clear and overt that we cannot say that the 
disciplinary action taken against Carter was retaliatory.” 292 
F.3d at 159. But I do not read this to mean that all “clear and 
overt” violations will lead to the same result. In that case, 
there was no direct evidence that the officials were motivated 
solely by a desire to retaliate. Rather, the best scenario for the 
inmate was that the officials had mixed motivations—some 
legitimate and others not. This is the situation in which the 
same decision defense is supposed to apply. However, in 
cases where there is direct evidence that retaliation drove a 
charging decision, the defense does not shield a defendant 
from liability. The defense’s very name belies its 
applicability.  
  To discourage overreading this concurrence, I note that 
I have no doubt that an official who disciplines an inmate for 
a “clear and overt” violation should enjoy a strong 
presumption that the same decision defense applies. As the 
Eighth Circuit has recognized, it would produce chaos if 
prisoners could survive summary judgment on retaliation 
claims in response to every routine disciplinary action. Such 
an outcome would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
instruction that, in “the volatile prison environment, it is 
essential that . . . officials be given broad discretion to 
prevent . . . disorder.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 
413 (1989). Thus, though a “legitimate prison disciplinary 
report” is not an “absolute bar to a retaliation claim,” it is 
“probative and potent summary judgment evidence.” Woods, 
60 F.3d at 1166. But the Eighth Circuit has overcorrected for 
the problem. There is no reason to disregard normal First 
Amendment standards by closing the door entirely. The 
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power to prevent disorder is not a license to retaliate. With 
the right evidence, the presumption should be rebuttable.  
*     *     *     *     * 
 In sum, today’s majority opinion clarifies that not 
every violation of prison protocols supported by some 
evidence will bar a First Amendment retaliation claim. That is 
particularly so with relatively minor offenses, such as a radio 
antenna secured by tape. The standards for more serious 
violations will need to be decided in future cases.   
 Joseph Watson v. Gerald L. Rozum, et al., No. 13-3510 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 The Court’s opinion and the concurrence shed light on 
a lacuna in our precedent on First Amendment retaliation 
claims in the prison context, namely whether and how a 
prisoner can overcome the “same decision” defense when the 
adverse action complained of is a charge of prison 
misconduct and the prisoner concedes the facts giving rise to 
the charge. Unlike my colleagues, however, I do not see this 
appeal as the appropriate vehicle for answering that question. 
Under the current state of the law, courts are required to 
uphold government action motivated by retaliatory animus as 
long as the responsible government officials can show that the 
same action would have occurred for reasons unrelated to 
retaliation—a mixed-motive defense. Here, the evidence the 
parties have proffered on summary judgment establishes at 
most that a prison guard acted with mixed motive, which is 
not enough. Because I believe Watson’s appeal flounders on 
that evidentiary ground, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
 In Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333–34 (3d Cir. 
2001), we “imported” the burden-shifting scheme enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 273, 288 (1977), to 
adjudicate First Amendment retaliation claims brought by 
prisoners. Under Mt. Healthy, the causal relationship between 
protected conduct and adverse action requires a showing of 
but-for causation. Instead of placing the heavy burden of 
proving but-for causation solely on the prisoner, however, we 
“divided the burden of proof relating to causation between the 
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parties.” Green v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011). 
Thus, once a prisoner shows that a retaliatory motive was a 
“substantial or motivating factor” leading to the adverse 
action, the burden shifts to prison officials to show that “they 
would have made the same decision absent the protected 
conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest.” See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. 
Accordingly, Rauser’s same-decision defense essentially 
requires prison officials to disprove that the retaliatory motive 
was a but-for cause of the adverse action.1  
 The upshot of Mt. Healthy and Rauser’s emphasis on 
but-for causation is that a prisoner cannot negate a same-
decision defense merely by pointing to the existence of 
retaliatory motive on the part of prison officials, i.e., that the 
prison officials acted with mixed motives. Instead, the 
prisoner must counter a same-decision defense directly, that 
is, with evidence demonstrating that retaliation was a but-for 
cause. To hold otherwise would permit the prisoner to 
override the same-decision defense using exactly the same 
evidence relevant to establishing his prima facie case. This, in 
turn, would vitiate the inference of but-for causation that 
                                                 
 1 Some of our sister courts impose a higher burden on 
prisoners. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 n.2 (citing Goff v. 
Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737–38 (8th Cir. 1993); Woods v. Smith, 
60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Hall, 610 
F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 
F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring the prisoner to 
prove that the adverse action “did not reasonably advance a 




arises when prison officials fail to prove the same-decision 
defense, see Greene, 660 F.3d at 979, and would undermine 
the purpose of allowing a mixed-motive defense in the first 
place: achieving an appropriate balance between protecting 
the prisoner’s constitutional rights, and avoiding the 
“undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of 
those rights.” 429 U.S. at 287.  
II 
 The Majority references but-for causation only in 
passing, and instead focuses its attention on the open question 
of what (if any) evidence a prisoner can offer to overcome the 
same-decision defense. It confronts this open question in a 
scenario that has received significant judicial attention but 
upon which we have opined only in limited fashion.  
Specifically, Watson has conceded the factual predicates 
giving rise to his misconduct— that his radio’s antenna was 
“loose” and “wiggly” and that he had secured the antenna to 
the radio with tape, see Watson Br. 16—but nonetheless 
contends that he was issued a misconduct in retaliation for 
requesting a grievance form. Several of our sister courts 
would foreclose his claim merely by virtue of the fact that his 
misconduct is supported by “some evidence,” Henderson v. 
Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994), or because “there is 
no dispute that [Watson] committed the most serious, if not 
all, of the prohibited conducted charged.” Gayle v. Gonyea, 
313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See also O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1215 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n inmate cannot state a claim of 
retaliation for a disciplinary charge involving a prison rule 
infraction when the inmate was found guilty of the actual 
behavior underlying that charge after being afforded adequate 
due process.”). Our only precedential foray into this area 
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acknowledges that a “clear and overt” violation of prison 
regulations could potentially preclude a genuine dispute of 
material fact on the same-decision defense. See Carter v. 
McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 These decisions suggest that a certain “quantum” of 
misconduct evidence, id., will “checkmate[]” a prisoner’s 
retaliation claim, Henderson, 29 F.3d at 469, a proposition 
that the Court today neither accepts nor rejects. Instead, the 
Majority asserts that the record in this case supports opposing 
inferences that establish a genuine dispute of material fact on 
Officer Coutts’s same-decision defense. Thus, the Majority 
contrasts this appeal with Carter v. McGrady by stating: 
Watson’s situation is different. Watson’s broken 
radio was not so “clear and overt” a violation 
that we can conclude that he would have been 
written up if he had not also given prison 
officials “a hard time.” The radio had allegedly 
been in the same condition for more than a year. 
Moreover, there is evidence that other inmates 
had radios with loose or broken antennas, but 
those items were not confiscated and the 
inmates did not receive a misconduct. Finally, 
[Officer] Kline did not charge Watson with a 
misconduct when he confiscated the radio.  
Accordingly, a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the misconduct was issued in 
retaliation for Watson’s statement that he was 
going to file a grievance, and not in furtherance 
of legitimate penological goals. 
Majority Op. 12–13.  
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 Based on my examination of the summary judgment 
record, I do not agree that “Watson’s situation is different.” 
At best, his evidence reiterates that retaliation was among 
Coutts’s motivations for issuing the misconduct, but does not 
demonstrate that Watson would not have received the 
misconduct in the absence of that retaliatory motive. In other 
words, Watson’s evidence fails to establish a genuine dispute 
concerning the element of but-for causation (or lack thereof) 
that lies at the center of the same-decision defense. 
Accordingly, this appeal does not present an occasion for us 
to consider whether and how the same-decision defense can 
be overcome.  
 The Majority places substantial weight on statements 
made by Coutts to the effect that he issued the misconduct 
because Watson gave the guards a “hard time.” This evidence 
comes by way of Watson’s deposition testimony, and I 
excerpt the relevant portions of the record in the margin.2 The 
                                                 
2  A.  Officer Coutts . . . was 
interrogating me about the radio, 
saying that I gave his Captains 
and the other Officer a hard time 
by wanting my radio antenna 
fixed, instead of just leaving it 
alone. Now I’m going to get a 
Misconduct and Mr. DuPont is 
going to keep my radio. 
 App. 62. 
Q.  They’re going to keep your 
radio? That’s what [Coutts] said? 
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A.  Right . . . So we go back and 
forth. So I was telling [Coutts] 
that the [sic] Officer Kline broke 
it. So I was just asking him, could 
he fill out an incident report, so I 
could have my radio antenna 
fixed. And then he was saying . . . 
that I didn’t do it in a polite way 
and I wanted an incident report 
filled out. But then I asked for a 
Grievance, you know. And I said, 
yeah, well, that’s the policy, you 
know. I need an incident report 
filled out so that the Officer that 
broke the antenna, so I can have 
my radio fixed. But I still have to 
make a Complaint. 
Anyway, he said, well, go back to 
the Unit and they going to call 
you back down here to pick up 
your Misconduct. 
 App. 62–63. 
Q.  But you had thought that 
[Coutts] was calling you down to 
pick up your radio; right? 
A.  Right. But, the point is, when I 
got down here, he was 
interrogating me and he had told 
me, being that I gave his Captain 
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important point here is that Watson’s testimony establishes at 
most that Coutts acted with retaliatory motive, but it hardly 
demonstrates that his motive was a but-for cause of the 
misconduct. By permitting such an inference from Coutts’s 
admission, the Majority undoes the careful balance 
underlying the same-decision defense by allowing Watson to 
survive summary judgment simply by asserting that Coutts 
acted with mixed motive. Moreover, by acknowledging that 
other prison officials in Coutts’s chain of command “would 
have approved the misconduct” irrespective of his request for 
a grievance, Majority Op. 8, the Majority’s inference of but-
for causation with respect to Coutts cannot be squared with its 
conclusions regarding causation as to the other defendants 
because all of them had a hand in bringing about the 
challenged conduct—the issuance of the misconduct. 
 The Majority’s consideration of the remaining 
evidence is equally unpersuasive. First, the Majority asserts 
that Watson’s broken radio was not a “clear and overt” 
                                                                                                             
and the other Officer a hard time, 
I’m going to be written-up.  
 App. 65. 
A.  Right. [Coutts] stated, you 
gave my Captain and the other 
Officers a hard time, wanting a 
Grievance and an Incident Report 
filled out. For that, you’re getting 
a Misconduct.  
 App. 90. 
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violation of prison regulations in contradistinction to Carter. 
However, under these regulations, “any item altered from its 
original state (state issued or personal) may be considered 
contraband,” App. 4 (quoting DC-ADM-815 § 3.C.1), and 
there is no factual dispute that Watson altered his radio’s 
antenna by securing it to the radio with tape. As such, the 
radio was contraband, and Watson’s possession of it was 
unquestionably a violation. To the extent that the Majority 
disagrees, it is worth noting that Watson has not challenged 
the regulation’s validity, and its application to his radio is 
neither irrational nor fails to serve a legitimate penological 
interest. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Indeed, 
it is not difficult to see why a detached antenna poses a 
security threat in a prison. 
 Second, the Majority emphasizes the temporal aspects 
surrounding the issuance of Watson’s misconduct, 
specifically that Officer Kline failed to issue a misconduct 
when he confiscated Watson’s radio, and the radio had been 
contraband for over a year without action from prison 
officials. It is not clear how these considerations should cut 
with respect to Coutts, as opposed to Kline or the other 
officers. There is no suggestion that Coutts failed to act 
immediately when he learned of Watson’s radio, or that he (or 
any other officer for that matter) was simply hunting for an 
infraction of prison rules. Thus, I do not agree that the timing 
of the misconduct issued against Watson supports an 
inference of but-for causation against Coutts. 
 Finally, the Majority suggests that Watson has shown 
discriminatory application of the contraband regulation based 
on evidence that similarly situated prisoners with broken 
radios were not issued misconducts because they did not 
make requests to file grievances. I agree that the disparate 
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treatment of similarly situated individuals can support an 
inference of but-for causation, but Watson’s evidence falls far 
short of the mark. The evidence in question comprises 
declarations filed by three of Watson’s fellow prisoners: 
Frank Trainer, Harry Montgomery, and Ronald Banks. The 
affidavits filed by Trainer and Montgomery are not probative 
in this case because they fail to identify any of the officers 
responsible for the averred conduct; Banks’s declaration 
names Captains Simosko and Dupont, but says nothing about 
Coutts, so it too is of limited value. Banks’s declaration 
actually cuts against Watson because it mentions an instance 
in which Simosko and Dupont upheld a misconduct charge 
involving an “altered” radio in the absence of a grievance 
request, i.e. a paradigmatic nonretaliatory application of the 
contraband regulation. See App. 127. Thus, I cannot agree 
with the Majority that Watson’s evidence suffices to create a 
genuine dispute as to whether he would have received his 
misconduct in the absence of his request to file a grievance. 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
